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Campbell: The Separate Judicial Opinion and Growth of the Law: Holmes' Diss

THE SEPARATE JUDICIAL OPINION AND
GROWTH OF THE LAW:
Holmes' Dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner
Thomas P. Campbell, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

For hundreds of years common law appellate courts decided cases1
by issuing several opinions on each case which came before them.
Every member of the judicial panel was entitled to express himself on
the issues involved in the controversy, and each usually did so. The
particular dispute in litigation would be resolved by counting the
number of votes on either side, and by making an appropriate award.
Most cases, therefore, did not result in an opinion of the court in the
form familiar to modern students of the law.
According to judicial lore, Chief Justice John Marshall put to an
end, for American courts, the practice of issuing several opinions and
began a procedure of consolidation of judicial wisdom into a single
2
opinion from the court as a group. Each member was still free to
express himself individually in either a concurrence or a dissent, but
most did not, and adhered to Marshall's theory that more importance
would be attached to the work of the Court if a clear precedent-making
opinion could be agreed upon and published. Experience seems to
have borne out the great Chief Justice, if the significance of his court,
both in history and today in American life, is a measure of the merit of
his ideas. Opinions of the court are the rule in American law, and a case
and
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where the panel of judges divides into several separate opinions

without a majority is not only exceptional, it is unsatisfactory to the
3

judges themselves.
Solitary judicial opinions, nevertheless, continue to be written by

American judges, and, when balanced by the majority opinion, may be

the source of great personal satisfaction to their authors. 4 Even more

important than a vehicle for the individual pleasure of its author, the
solitary opinion may frequently be the beginning of a new doctrine in

the growth of the law. Concurrences in the conclusion of the majority
of the court, based upon a different reason, or dissents from that

conclusion, provide an opportunity for the expression of ideas,
theories, or doubts which may contain the ultimately more agreeable

solution to the problem of the litigants, or the community, than does

the conventional wisdom of the majority.5 This study shall examine in
detail one such solitary opinion for the purpose of tracing the growth

of the law as it changed to meet an emerging need of society.

The opinion to be analyzed is the dissent of Judge Oliver Wendell

Holmes from the majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

in 1896 in the case of Vegelahn v. Guntner.6 Controversies involving
concerted action by laborers against employers had become an important
matter of judicial business by the end of the nineteenth century, and the
courts, as well as the general community, were not sure how they should
be dealt with. This uncertain state of the law had demonstrated a sorely

felt need for creative legal theorizing. 7 Having done some of that work,
Judge Holmes availed himself of the opportunity to use his office to

3. See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437
(1955); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. "The judge who writes for the Court must not roam the fields; on the contrary, he must
weigh his words within an ambit of discretion so that he may secure agreement from his fellows.
He must avoid confusion and uncertainty not only to obtain unanimity but also to command
respect from the bar and the public for the decision of the Court. It is the dissenter who dares to be
outspoken ... "P. JACKSON, supranote 2, at 15. Felix Frankfurter suggested that dissents could
be solos instead of orchestral performances. Quoted in C. Fairman, Introduction in The Writing
of Judicial Biography- A Symposium, 24 IND. L.J. 363, 368 (1949).

5. "A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the

dissentingjudge believes the court to have been betrayed." C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 68 (1966).

6. 167 Mass. 92, 104,44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1896).
7. In the years immediately prior to 1896, the most significant decision of the Supreme

Judicial Court affecting labor relations was Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888).

There, a single picket carried a banner requesting the boycott of a shop because of the low wages it
paid its employees. The court held the action to be a nuisance and an unlawful interference with
the owner's business. An injunction was issued without consideration of the rights or interests of
the employees. Holmes participated in the decision, but not in the writing of the opinion.
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attempt to develop a new way of analyzing these controversies. Given his
legal genius, writing talents, and professional prominence, his efforts met
great success. This happy combination of characteristics does not often
come into confluence around a singlejudicial opinion, but having done so
at least once, the effect of the meeting merits some extended study. While
it is easy to overstate the effect of this opinion, it may be asserted that
American labor relations law was profoundly affected by Holmes' dissenting opinion.
THE SETTING

The Picketing and Strike Begins
Factually, the controversy was quite simple. Frederick 0. Vegelahn
owned a furniture factory near the waterfront, on North Street in Boston
in 1894.8 He had a sizeable business employing a large number of men in a
large plant, which produced chairs and couches for the local market. 9
Furniture and upholstery workers recently had been active in attempting
to improve their economic circumstances, as had many other laboring
people of that era. Most Boston furniture manufacturers had acquiesced

in their demands by raising wages to a standard amount, by accepting a
pricing schedule' 0 for products to avoid competitive undercutting of one
another to the disadvantage of the organized employees, and by instituting a nine hour work day in their establishments." Vegelahn had not done
SO.
In October a group of Vegelalm's workers visited the office of the
wood workers union' 2 in Boston and, explaining their situation, asked
for the aid of the union in persuading their employer to meet their needs.
8. The factual background of this litigation, as presented in this study, is based upon the
original papers in the files of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unless otherwise
attributed. Where representations of events are patently partial, an attempt to balance them by
noting the statement of an adversary has been made. Citations are to documents as titled by their
authors or by the court.
9. Bill of Complaint, Record.
10. Throughout the litigation papers the term "price schedule" or "price list" is used. The
meaning of the term is the wage rates paid to employees, rather than the cost of goods payable by
customers. See-W. LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 23-24 (1959). Contemporary news accounts plainly state that the dispute was grounded in the employer's refusal to accede
to the demand of workers for a wage increase "of about 15 percent." Boston Herald, Nov. 15,
1894, at 3, col. 4.
I1. On Nov. 13, 1894, a three day strike by twelve furniture workers at the Boston factory of
J. Rennison was settled when the employer instituted a new wage schedule and a union shop.
Boston Globe, Nov. 13, 1894, at 7, col. 7; Boston Post, Nov. 13, 1894, at 5, col. 7.
12. In the records of the Supreme Judicial Court, the full name of the union is presented as
"The International Furniture Workers Union of America, Locals Nos. 24 and 53, Upholsterers
and The Wood Workers Local Union, Nos. 24 and 53."
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The workers were welcomed by the union, and George M. Guntner,
business agent of the organization, agreed to contact Vegelahn. Guntner
initially wrote to Vegelahn on behalf of Vegelahn's upholsterers, asking
that a wage scale be adopted together with a nine hour work day. After
about two weeks, having received no reply, Guntner paid a call on
Vegelahn and requested a response. Vegelahn was succinct: he would
have nothing to do with the union or Guntner and if his employees
desired anything, he alone would deal with them. Guntner responded
that he was the agent of the employees, that it was in Vegelahn's interests
to accommodate the workers, and that the wage scale would enable
Vegelahn to escape injurious competition. Vegelahn demurred.
Guntner waited another three weeks after his meeting and then
informed the workmen that Vegelahn had conclusively refused their
demands. The workers had previously resolved to strike in the event that
Guntner was not persuasive, and on November 14, 1894,13 they did so.
The Vegelahn group had been integrated into the union and followed its
procedures in planning their course of action. The men voted to strike,
the executive committee of the union approved and advised them to do
it, and Guntner gave them instructions for effective activity.
A room was obtained in a building in the neighborhood of Vegelahn's factory to be used as headquarters for the strike. Guntner advised
the workers to set up picket lines consisting of two men who would patrol
the street outside of the factory for continous periods between 6:30 a.m.
and 5:30 p.m. The pickets were directed to approach anyone on the street
who appeared to be an upholstery or wood worker or who was otherwise
concerned with their activity, in order to explain the purpose of their
picketing. Although one of the objects of the picket line was to discourage strikebreaking, Guntner specifically instructed the patrolling workers that they should not interfere with any person's desire to enter
Vegelahn's premises. Rather, the pickets should await his departure from
the factory and then renew their efforts to persuade him to join their
cause on behalf of all workers. Such people were to be invited to visit the
strike headquarters for a full explanation of the strikers' goals and for
invitations to join their union.
Vegelahn, however, charged that the pickets actively prevented
others from entering the factory by blocking its doors, using abusive
language, and by threatening or intimidating those who had business at

13. This date is used by the brief for the plaintiff and i; supported by newspaper accounts,
but the official statement of the case at 167 Mass. 93, states "on or about November 21, 1894."See
Brief for Plaintiffat 1,Record; Boston Globe, Nov. 15,1894, at 2, col. 2; Boston Herald, Nov. 15,
1894, at 3, col. 4.
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the factory. Vegelahn's complaint described his own efforts "to employ
14
other men to fill the places of the.., defendants" as having been
successful even though the pickets had "caused certain new men
employed as aforesaid to leave the employment of the plaintiff and [his]
15
premises."
Guntner and the pickets denied having used blocking tactics, mass
picketing, bad language, having threatened or intimidated anyone, having turned away people entering the factory, or having caused anyone to
leave Vegelahn's employ other than through the use of legitimate persuasion. Guntner did concede that he had informed one of Vegelahn's
insurers that the factory was being used as a lodging place by the
strikebreakers, when he had learned that cots had been set up to afford
sleeping arrangement inside. His purpose, he maintained, was merely to
inform the insurers of the extra hazard created, and not, as Vegelahn had
charged, to cause the insurance company to cancel its policy on Vegelahn's building. In any event, the insurance coverage on the building does
not seem to have been affected.
The pickets admitted that Vegelahn's delivery teams had been followed around town for the purpose of learning where the furniture was
being sold. They denied visiting or threatening any of Vegelahn's customers during the strike. Vegelahn charged that such visits and threats were
made to customers in Boston and other places, as well as to customers at
his North Street factory. He claimed that the harassment of his customers
and passers-by in the vicinity of the factory amounted to a common
nuisance and was part of a general scheme or conspiracy to injure his
business.
Apparently the workers had succeeded in bringing economic pressure on Vegelahn. He complained that if they were permitted to continue
their activities, the value of his business "would be further seriously
injured and destroyed.' 6 Guntner and the pickets claimed ignorance of
the value of the furniture business but they noted that Vegelahn's
employees could earn only an average of $7.00 weekly at the wages he
was paying. In response to the charge that they were interested in ruining
Vegelahn, Guntner produced a copy of a letter he had written to the
Massachusetts Board of Arbitration on December 5th which notified it
of the labor dispute. The letter requested that the Board attempt to
mediate the strike to obtain a settlement or to determine blame for the
continuation of the strike. The Board made such an attempt, Guntner

14.
15.
16.

Report at 3, Record.
Id.
Id.
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asserted, but Vegelahn refused to have anything to do with it.17 Further,
Guntner claimed, he had tried to have the Central Labor Union of
Boston lend its aid to settle the dispute, but Vegelahn also refused to have
anything to do with that organization.
The Legal Dispute: PreliminaryLitigation
Vegelahn's refusals were evidently grounded on the legal conclusions
that he had other courses open to him to remove his labor difficulties. On
December 6, 1894, he executed a complaint, which was filed the next day
in the Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County equity part, seeking an
injunction against the activity of the pickets and Guntner. Vegelahn
desired that they be kept away from his factory, away from any potential
new employees, away from customers or other visitors to his business, and
that they be subjected to any other prohibitions which seemed appropriate
to the court.
A preliminary hearing was held December 10th before Judge Mor-

ton on the plaintiff's motion. The judge announced his decision granting a
temporary injunction that same day, directing the pickets to refrain from

the behavior which Vegelahn had charged, thus providing him with the
entire relief sought. 8 The injunction was to remain in effect until such time
as the court could hold a full adversarial hearing on the desirability of a
permanent injunction. 19
17. Answer at 10, Record. The Boston Post, Dec. 12, 1894, at 8, col. 3, reporting the
application to the Board of Arbitration stated: "Mr. Vegelahn rejects any overtures by the Board,
saying that the men's action has caused him to feel unwilling to arbitrate."
18. The Decree, granting an injunction pendente lite was dated two days later, on
December 12, 1894. Decree at 5, Record.
19. Newspaper accounts stated that the hearing lasted allday. Boston Globe, Dec. 11,1894,
at 6, col. 4. The full text of the opinion by Judge Morton does not appear in the records of the
court, but was printed in one local newspaper.
The present application is for a temporary injunction and is to be considered somewhat
differently than where the case is to be heard on its merits. It appears well settled that on
Nov. 14 some eighteen men went out on a strike at Mr. Vegelahn's factory. The question
of their right to go out is not involved in this case. Another thing that is well settled is
that immediately on the beginning of the strike there was a scheme put on foot to
interfere with the efforts of Mr. Vegelahn to fill the places of the strikers. The strikers
proceeded to carry out the scheme, not by persuasion or seeing men at different places,
but by organizing a patrol, which, during business hours, passed up and down in front of
Mr. Vegelahn's premises, and that continued from Nov. 14 up to last Friday, when notice
of this proceeding was served on the defendants.
The purpose of this patrol was to intercept persons intending to go into the factory
to get work. It makes no special difference whether the patrol spoke to men or whether
they carried banners. No body of strikers have a right to organize a patrol and march up
and down in front of premises of the employer for the purpose of deterring persons from
going to work. In this case, however, the strikers went further and not only used
persuasion but used intimidation towards at least one witness, who, it appears, was
given reason to apprehend violence if he continued in Mr. Vegelahn's employ.
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Counsel for the defendants 2 filed a detailed response to Vegelahn's
charges several weeks later, on January 28, 1895. Most of the facts were
admitted in the response and the defendants, as had the plaintiff, resorted
to the law. Their general demurrer served to focus attention21 on the law,
where it was to remain for the duration of the controversy.
On May 20th, a full hearing was held to determine whether the
23
temporary injunction should be made permanent. 22 The presiding judge
was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., associate justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court. Holmes was fifty-four years old, in his fourteenth year as a member
of the court, and ranked third in seniority out of the seven member
bench.24 He was the famous son of a famous father, having gained an

international reputation with the publications of his seminal work, The
Common Law, in 1881. 25 Holmes was interested in the legal problems

presented by intentional business torts, such as the conduct with which the
defendants were charged, and he had recently published a thoughtful
26
analysis of those problems.

Even more, it appears from the testimony of one of the police that on several
occasions street and sidewalk were obstructed. Taking everything into account it seems
clear that the persons have gone further than they had a right to go. The result has been
to injure Mr. Vegelahn in his business and property. If I was persuaded that the stop put
to the acts of the defendants on Friday was final, it would put this case in a different
attitude; but finding as I do an organized scheme on the part of the strikers and members
of the Protective Union to prevent men from going in, I cannot feel a reasonable
assurance that it would not be resumed tomorrow. I think it a case for injunction.
Boston Post, Dec. I1, 1894, at 8, cols. 3 and 4.
20. The defendants had been represented at the hearing for the temporary restraining order
by James E. Hayes, John H. O'Neill and S.A. Fuller. On January 10, 1895, Thomas H. Russell
filed his appearance as attorney for Guntner. On January 28, this was followed by a filing by the
firm of Russell and Russell as counsel for the eleven individual workers named as co-defendants.
Record.
21. Demurrer at 5, Record.
22. No date for the hearing appears in the records of the court, but the personal Bench
Book of Holmes notes that the hearing was held May 20, 1895. O.W. HOLMES, BENCH BOOK 161
(available in Harvard Law School Library, Holmes Manuscript Collection).
23. Pursuant to Massachusetts law, 1886 Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 151, §30, a single judge of the
Supreme Judicial Court regularly sat in sessions in Boston for the purpose of hearing disputes in
equity. In April and May of 1895, Holmes had the assignment. BENCH BOOK supra note 22.
24. Holmes has been the subject of several biographies, notably the uncompleted work by
Mark De Wolfe Howe, I M. DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE SHAPING
YEARS, 1841-1870 (1957) and 2 M.DEWVOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
PROVING YEARS, 1870-1882 (1963) and F FRANKFURTER, MR JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE
SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1961). See also S. BENT, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1932), F.
BIDDLE, MR JUSTICE HOLMES (1942), and C. BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS (1944).
25 See 2 M.DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PROVING YEARS,
1870-1882 at 249-51 (1963).
26. Holmes, Privilege,Malice andIntent, 8 HARV. L. REV. I (1894). See p.23, infra,at notes
107-112.
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In the case before him Holmes found little factual dispute. 27 The
defendants admitted that they had conspired to keep Vegelahn from
getting workers to replace his striking employees and thereby to prevent
him from maintaining his business. Holmes reviewed the pleadings and
determined that the patrolling pickets, in the course of carrying out their
aims, presented a danger of violence even under the most favorable
circumstances. When the patrols added threats against present or potential strikebreaking employees, Holmes concluded that the possibility of
violence became likely. He decided that the principal question before him
was the legality of the pickets' means in pursuit of their goal to injure
Vegelahn economically. If the purpose was lawful, Holmes suggested, it
followed that "persuasion, advice, and social pressure brought to bear
upon" allies of Vegelahn could be permitted.28
Holmes commented on the possibility of violence, but stated that, "I
do not think violence so inseparably connected with strikes as to warrant
declaring a combination for a lawful purpose illegal simply on that
ground."2 9
The more difficult legal question was whether the defendants' purpose was itself lawful and permissible, given the fact that their tactics
constituted an attempt to intentionally injure Vegelahn's business. Holmes
noted that gratuitous injury to another's business, by persuading others to
stay away, is actionable and could be enjoined. But, he reasoned, when
statements are honestly made in response to an inquiry from another, to
enable that person to best act in his own self-interest, the statements are
privileged and no liability can attach to them. The value of free information, Holmes asserted, outweighs the harm of an occasional injustice. All
this he considered to be settled tort law. Guntner and the other defendants,
of course, were acting in the most vital self-interest, in a struggle to force
Vegelahn to accept their wage demands. Holmes concluded that the
purpose of the strikers was sufficient to justify their action. 30
27. The unpublished decision of Holmes, accompanying his injunction decree of June I,
1895 is part of the official Record of the litigation, found in the files of the Supreme Judicial
Court.
28. Opinion, Equity Sitting at 7, Record.
29. Id. Not all judges in Holmes' era agreed. McPherson, J. expressed the following
opinion: "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be
chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching." Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad Co. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa 1905), and Jenkins, J., used this language: "It is
idle to talk of a peaceable strike. None such ever occurred. The suggestion is impeachment of
intelligence." Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 60 F. 803, 821 (E.D. Wis.
1894), rev'd sub nom, Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F.310 (7th Cir. 1894).
30. The question is whether this purpose justified acts which otherwise would be
unlawful. I think it does, although I fear that the weight ofjudicial opinion at present is
the other way. I think that the principle of free competition which carries with it free
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Holmes next considered whether lawful ends might be rendered
unlawful by virtue of the means of combination. He discounted that
theory as being unfounded in law.31 Where a disproportion of power
resulted from combination, there perhaps could be some basis for such a
result in law, Holmes thought, but not without the suggestion that the
32
concentration of forces was an example of the fittest having survived.
Holmes confessed to some doubt regarding his position on the patrolling
by the pickets, as the picketing could well produce violence from the
threats and physical confrontation. Since it was part of the activity which
he had pronounced lawful, he decided to give the patrol the benefit of his
doubt, concluding, "I shall not enjoin a patrol limited to lawful
methods."3 3 Second thoughts occurred to Holmes after having prepared
his opinion. Before releasing it, he modified his draft by adding two
additional sentences. "It will be understood that what I say as to persuasion applies only to persuasion not to make contracts. It does not apply to
persuasion to break contracts already made."34 The effect of this supplement was significant as it removed from the permissible reach of the
pickets' activity the new workers whom Vegelahn had hired to act as strike
breakers and to fill the vacant positions of the very men who were
picketing. Knowing that a worker who was newly hired by Vegelahn
would be protected from their activity, the pickets would inevitably feel
hard pressed to turn away applicants from those places, and thus bring
great pressure to bear upon men who had not yet made contracts with
Vegelahn. Holmes' caveat thereby increased the likelihood of violence, the
very event which troubled him most in reaching his decision.
In the Final Decree, on the injunction, dated June 1, 1895, and
prepared to reflect the opinion of Holmes, it was ordered that the defendants and their agents and servants be enjoined from physically interfering
with anyone entering or leaving Vegelahn's factory, and from verbally
intimidating any present or potential employees of Vegelahn from contincombination is of more importance than the harm that may be done to the successful
competitor .... It was said at the argument that this was not competition. It is true
verbally, but not with reference to the principle which I am trying to express. I mean by
free competition, a free commercial fight subject to the rules of the game as to fair play.
Opinion, Equity Sitting at 7, Record.
31. Substantial authority differed with Holmes and held that combination could make for
V
illegality. See Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894) (Harlan, J.) and cases cited therein.
32. For Holmes' thoughts on such contests, see Holmes, The Gas Stokers'Strike,7 AM. L.
REV. 582, 583 (1873); See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
33. Opinion, Equity Sitting at 8, Record.
34. Records of the Supreme Judicial Court include the original version of the Holmes
opinion, amended in his handwriting to make the change. His second thoughts avoided the
necessity of controverting established case law as to existing contracts. See Thacker Coal & Coke
Co. v. Burke, 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S.E. 161 (1906); Annot. 84 A.L.R. 43, 77, 98 (1933).
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uing or beginning work for him. 35 Picketing to persuade the public to shun
Vegelahn and his customers or employees was not prohibited by the
provisions of the decree and neither, curiously, was peaceful and orderly
persuasion of non-striking employees to join the strike. Despite his afterthought, it is possible that Holmes considered the chance of persuasion
directed against those with "contracts already made" 36 so unlikely that it
did not bear specific prohibition in the decree. Another possibility, more
likely, is oversight.
On the same day that the Final Decree was issued, Holmes prepared
a Report. This document summarized the record of the litigation in order
to assist the full bench of the Supreme Judicial Court in its review.37 In his
Report to his colleagues, Holmes indicated which facets of the problem
were important to him in reaching his decision to limit the initial
injunction. Because his analysis of the law emphasized the importance of
legal justification when one harmed another, he began with a short review
of the factual circumstances. There was a strike in progress, he noted, with
a limited goal of gaining an economic advantage for the defendants. If that
goal should be attained, the activity of the defendants would cease. In
their efforts to prevent Vegelahn from obtaining workmen and carrying
on his business, the defendants effectively used "persuasion and social
pressure[,] [a]nd these means are sufficient to affect the plaintiff
disadvantageously, although it does not appear, if that be material, that
they are sufficient to crush him."38 Because the use of those means for their
purpose was justified, Holmes reported, he had refused to enjoin them. He
conceded that if the means had been unjustified, or unlawful, an injunction against them would be appropriate.
Holmes admitted that the additional means of "threats of personal
injury or unlawful harm" 39 had been used against present or prospective
employees of Vegelahn, "although no actual violence was used beyond a
technical battery, and although the threats were a good deal disguised and
35. 167 Mass. at 96, 44 N.E. at 1077. The date of the decree is shown in the files of the
court. Report, Final Decree, at 11.
36. See supra note 34.
37. 167 Mass. at 95-96. Massachusetts law in 1895 provided that suits for injunction should
initially be heard and determined by a singlejustice. 1886 Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 151, § 11. Upon the
issuance of a final decree, the justice was empowered to report the case to the full bench for its
consideration of questions of law. 1886 Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 151, §20. Similarly, upon demurrer by
one of the parties to the single justice's resolution of a question of law, the case could be reported
to the full bench. H. BUSH WELL& C. WALCOTT, PRACTICE AND PLEADING IN PERSONAL ACTIONS

IN THE COURTS OF MASSACHUSETTS 17 n.1 (2d rev. ed. 1883). Counsel for the defendants in this
cese filed a demurrer with the court on January 28, 1895, thus providing the basis for Holmes'
Report.
38. 167 Mass. at 95.
39. Id.
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express words were avoided." 40 In the final version of his statement,
Holmes added another sentence: "It appeared to me that there was danger
of similar acts in the future."41 He concluded that these additional means
should be enjoined.
Vegelahn's greatest problem was the pressure applied to him by the
patrolling pickets outside his factory. Holmes next reported the details of
that activity. A patrol of two men was established, between 6:30 a.m. and
5:30 p.m., changing every hour. At times the numer of men was greater,
and at times "on one of the busy streets of Boston" 42 he emphasized, there
was "some little inclination to stop the plaintiffs door. '43 It seemed proper
to enjoin this more serious activity. Where the activity of the pickets went
beyond simple advice to passers-by, yet had "not obtruded beyond the
point where the other person was willing to listen" 44 Holmes indicated
some uncertainty, but implied that overreaching by the pickets would fall
into the category of improper means. He reiterated that the patrol should
not be enjoined if confined solely to persuasion and the dissemination of
information. Persuasion to break existing employent agreements, however, was unlawful and properly enjoined. In such form and at such point,
the controversy came to the full membership of the Supreme Judicial
45
Court for its review.
REVIEW BY THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Vegelahn's injunction, as modified on June 1, 1895, continued in
effect while the proceeding was pending before the court. Argument by
counsel was scheduled for March 24, 1895 with Edwin B. Hale of the
Boston law firm of Hale and Dickerman appearing on behalf of Vegelahn,
and Thomas H. Russell of Russell and Russell, also a Boston firm,
46
representing Guntner and the individually named pickets.
Hale, of course, was desirous of absolutely terminating the picketing
and he sought to convince the court that the patrol should have been
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 96.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Holmes' opinion does not appear in the official published report of the decision in
volume 167 of Massachusetts Reports, nor does it appear to have been published in any of the
daily newspapers of Boston. However, it seems to have attracted some attention among interested
persons. Frank K. Foster, a prominent Boston labor leader wrote to Holmes on May 28, 1895 that
"your decision in the Vegelahn case, I need not say, is highly gratifying to many of our people.
Where can I get in full for publication?" Letter from Frank K. Foster to Oliver Wendell Holmes
(May 28, 1895) (available in Harvard Law School Library, Holmes Manuscript Collection).
46. The defendants had been represented in the proceeding for the temporary restraining
order by the firm of Hayes and O'Neil. Russell filed his appearance with the court on January 10,
1895. Supra note 20.
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enjoined without exception. A broad attack was made against the
defendants' behavior through allegations that the picketing was a general
threat and menace, regardless of whether it was a civil or criminal wrong.
Hale argued that the picketing was a nuisance subject to the traditional
equitable remedy of injunction. He did not limit himself to a single line of
argument, and he further maintained that the defendants had formed an
illegal conspiracy against Vegelahn which could not be justified on any
basis, including that of free competition. The argument relied on much
English law for its support, although Hale also made good use of the
limited number of Massachusetts precedents available. 47
By contrast, Russell had the greater burden. The law tended to be
against him, as Holmes had noted, 48 and he cited only four judicial
decisions and one treatise 49 as authority for his arguments. Russell
accepted all of the limitations of the Final Decree upon the pickets'
activity and embraced Holmes' analysis. He maintained that trade unions
were lawful in Massachusetts, that workers were free to combine and to
use accepted business tactics to further their own interest, and, that in the
absence of methods employing violence or physical coercion and
intimidation, there was no basis in the law for a prohibition or picketing.
Indeed, Russell argued, it was desirable for the courts to approve
picketing in order to insure the continued peaceful expressing of the
grievances of working people.
The matter was taken under advisement by the Supreme Judicial
Court and seven months elapsed before a decision was announced. 50 The
difficulty in resolving the controversy within the court was underscored by
the unusual occurrence of two dissenting judges separating themselves
from the majority with individual opinions. 5 1 The senior Associate
Justice, Charles Allen, wrote for the majority, while dissents were filed by
Chief Justice Wallbridge A. Field and Holmes, who had been unable to
convince his brethren of the merit of his earlier conclusions.
Justice Allen's opinion exemplified the operation of the double
standard which characterized judicial analysis of labor relations in the

47. Brief for Plaintiff, Record, citingSherryv. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212,17 N.E. 307 (1888);
Walker v. Cronin. 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894).
48. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
49. Brief for Respondents at 6, Record. Russell conceded that the cited treatise, S & B
WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (1894), stated that picketing resulting in intimidation
was unlawful and should be "repressed."
50. 167 Mass. 92,44 N.E. 1077 (1896).
51. Only eight dissenting opinions were written by all of the members of the Supreme
Judicial Court in 1896. Twelve dissenting votes were cast that year. H. SHRIVER, THE JUDICIAL
OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 325, 326 (1940).
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era. 52 Allen, describing the circumstances of the picketing, opened his
opinion with quotations and paraphrasing from the equity sitting Report.
He termed the picketing part of a conspiracy against Vegelahn "to prevent
him from carrying on his business, unless and until he should adopt a
certain schedule of prices."5 3 In the Report, Holmes had used the same
language, but had continued ".. . and for the purpose of compelling him
to accede to that schedule, but for no other purpose. If he adopts that
schedule he will not be interfered with further."54 Allen immediately
concluded that the picketing
was thus one means of intimidation, indirectly to the plaintiff, and
directly to persons actually employed, or seeking to be employed, by
the plaintiff, and of rendering such employment unpleasant or
intolerable to such persons. Such an act is an unlawful interference
with the rights both of employer and of employed. 55
Allen believed that such interference with the beginning of or the continuation of employment was contrary to judicial precedent, Massachusetts
criminal statutes, the Constitution, morality, and certainly amounted
56
to a tortious nuisance.
Since the presence of justification might eliminate the basis for
finding a tortious nuisance, the opinion dealt specifically with that
possibility and, in doing so, applied a different standard from Holmes' to
57
judge the conduct of the pickets.
Although a combination of business interests to pressure another to
take action furthering their own cause was generally considered by
American courts to be good business practice and not actionable, 58 Allen
and the majority of the court found that such a combination by labor was
not justified. Furthermore, this section of the opinion demonstrated the
52.

See C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW, chs. 2-3 (2d rev. ed. 1961), and text, infra, at

note 82.
53. 167 Mass. at 97,44 N.E. at 1077.
54.

Id. at 95.

55. Id. at 97, 44 N.E. at 1077.
56. Id. at 97, 98, 44 N.E. at 1077, 1078.
57. The defendants contend that these acts were justifiable, because they were only
seeking to secure better wages for themselves by compelling the plaintiff to accept their
schedule of wages. This motive or purpose does notjustify maintaining a patrol in front
of the plaintifrs premises, as a means of carrying out their conspiracy. A combination
among persons merely to regulate their own conduct is within allowable competition,
and is lawful, although others may be indirectly affected thereby. But a combination to
do injurious acts expressly directed to another, by way of intimidation or constraint,
either of himself or of persons employed or seeking to be employed by him, is outside of
allowable competition, and is unlawful.
Id. at 98, 99, 44 N.E. at 1077, 1078.
58. Bowen v. Matheson, 96 Mass. 499 (1867); Gregory, supranote 52.
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importance of Allen's omission of the qualifying language from Holmes'
conclusion in the Report. 59 Holmes had decided that the workmen had
taken their action primarily in furtherance of their own interests, and that
the harmful effect on Vegelahn's business was a secondary purpose,
however necessary and inevitable. Allen's assumption was that the
conduct must be judged solely by its effect, and that whatever its actual
purpose, there could be no justification for the infliction of injury upon
Vegelahn and the interference With his right to carry on his business as he
pleased. 60
Similarly, Allen placed great emphasis upon the means of conscription of third parties into the dispute by the pickets. He gave no
consideration to any means other than "of intimidation or constraint"6 1 of
present or future employees of Vegelahn. Forms of physical, intimidating,
or threatening persuasion had been proscribed by the Final Decree of
June 1, 1895, and had been expressly disavowed by Russell, the attorney
for the defense. 62 The legality of any other form of persuasion or "social
pressure, 6 3 as Allen referred to it, either through speech ot the presence of
the patrol in front of Vegelahn's factory, was the central question decided
by the court. In fact, such persuasion might have been directed at the
public in general or those members of the public who might be interested
in becoming Vegelahn's employees. No issue had been raised concerning
the general public as targets of the action, but as to those in the latter
group, Allen had no doubt that the "threats and intimidation"6 4 directed
against them were unlawful and should be enjoined. Again, the intention
of the pickets was assumed to be the impermissible infliction of injury
upon the employer, and the possibility of legally justifiable self-benefiting
ends, or privilege, was ignored by the majority opinioti.
Although courts of equity normally refrain from enjoining behavior
which might be considered criminal, the majority concluded that the
danger of continuing injury to Vegelahn's property and business interest
should be met by an injunction. The full bench of the Supreme Judicial
Court ordered that the Final Decree issued by Holmes seventeen months
earlier be overturned and that the original and broad preliminary
59. 167 Mass. at 95, 44 N.E. at 1077.
60. Holmes' analysis, naturally, depended upon the assumption that, in addition to the
right of the employer to carry on his business, the law must heed the privilege of the employees to
combine to further their own interests. See W. Nelles & S. Mermin, Holmes and Labor Law, 12
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 517, 520 (1936).
61. 167 Mass. at 99, 44 N.E. at 1078.
62. "It is not contended that a labor organization, by itself or agents, may seek to effect its
purposes by any physical force or violence whatsoever." Brief for Respondents at 3, Record,
63. 167 Mass. at 97, 44 N.E. at 1077.
64. Id. at 99, 44 N.E. at 1078.
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injunction of December 1894 be restored against Guntner and the pickets.
The effect of the injunction was to terminate the picketing and, thus, any
hope of success with Frederick 0. Vegelahn and his wage schedules was
ended. 65 Two members of the Court disagreed.
Chief Justice Field prepared a careful analysis of the law upon which
the majority opinion had depended. 66 He began his analysis by discussing
the principal decisions of American and English courts which formed the
precedents used by Justice Allen. Field distinguished or discounted these
decisions as being based upon varying factual circumstances, or law which
was unsound in 1896.67 The source of disagreement between Field and his
colleagues was a belief on his part that an injunction was an inappropriate
remedy in a dispute of the nature before them. He considered these
problems to be best resolved by legislation. Field feared erratic results if
judges were forced to act in the absence of statutes, since "if the acts
complained of do not amount to intimidation or force, it is not in all
68
respects clear what are lawful and what are not lawful at common law.
Justification could not be a satisfactory standard for evaluating these
potentially tortious acts, he argued, nor could malice be used. Both
concepts were subjective and, therefore, unsatisfactory. Field did not
dispute the claim that Guntner and the pickets might have wronged
Vegelahn, although he doubted that they had done anything illegal. He did
believe that equity should have been denied to Vegelahn since civil or
criminal law would have been available to provide all the necessary relief if
illegality were to be established. Field concluded that in the absence of an
objection by the defendants to the original injunction, the court should
have confined itself to an affirmance of the decree entered by Justice
Holmes.
HOLMES' DISSENT

In the second dissenting opinion, Holmes issued a manifesto which,
as shall be demonstrated, became an important contribution to the devel65. By ignoring the distinction between those members of the public who might be interested
in entering Vegelahn's premises as applicants for employment or as customers, and those who
were disinterested passers-by, and by removing any provisions of the injunction which limited its
protections "only to persons who are bound by existing contracts," Id. at 100, 44 N.E. at 1078, the
court effectively banned all picketing at the site of the dispute and destroyed any possibility of
successful concerted action by the workers.
66. Id.
67. He conceded Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888), to be an important
precedent. This was the first decision of the Supreme Judicial Court to approve the issuance of an
injunction in a labor dispute. Nonetheless, Field argued, the decision appeared to be based upon
English decisions which had been overruled or superseded by statutes. 167 Mass. at 101, 102, 44
N.E. at 1078, 1079.
68. Id. at 102, 44 N.E. at 1079.
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opment of labor relations law in the twentieth century. 69 Holmes agreed

with the other judges that their view represented the widely accepted legal
wisdom on the topic, but he believed that wisdom to be both misguided

and wrong. He rejected their analysis, their interpretation of the facts in
the dispute, their social theories, their idea of what the role of their court in
the controversy ought to be, their economics, and their resulting legal
conclusions. He urged a reconsideration of these components of the law in

language and philosophy sufficiently compelling to win that goal from his
own court and, ultimately, from the nation.

Beginning with a deprecatingly toned disapproval of judicial
dissenting opinions, 70 Holmes then referred to the Report and its factual conclusions. His entire opinion, longer than Allen's or Field's, was a subdued

re-examination of legal conclusions expressed by the majority. He noted
that since there had been no issue raised concerning compliance with the

final injunction by the pickets, the question which should have been

decided by the court was the adequacy of the terms or the scope of the

relief. Comparing the preliminary with this final injunction revealed that

"the former goes further, and forbids the defendants to interfere with the
plaintiff's business 'by any scheme... organized for the purpose of...
preventing any person or persons who now are or may hereafter be...
desirous of entering the [plaintiffs employment] from entering it.'' 71 The
important distinction between the terms of the two decrees was the
prohibition by the earlier injunction of attempts by the pickets, however
orderly their efforts, to engage in "social intercourse" 72 or persuasion to

keep away those who might contract with Vegelahn for employment or otherwise. Holmes objected that the conclusion of the majority assumed that
the pickets, necessarily constituted a threat of bodily harm, and he reiter69. According to the correspondence of President Theodore Roosevelt, the dissenting
opinion also profoundly affected the growth of American jurisprudence in the first third of the
twentieth century by influencing him in favor of Holmes. While reviewing with Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge the qualifications of Holmes to fill a vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court in 1902,
Roosevelt wrote: "The labor decisions which have been criticized by some of the big railroad men
and other members of large corporations constitute to my mind a strong point in Judge Holmes'
favor .... I think it eminently desirable that our Supreme Court should show in unmistakable
fashion their entire sympathy with all proper effort to secure the most favorable possible
consideration for the men who most need that consideration." I SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HENRY CABOT LODGE, 1884-1918 517 (Lodge ed.
1925). Roosevelt offered Holmes the appointment two weeks later, on July 25, 1902. F. BIDDLE,
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 101 (1942).
70. Holmes was not merely offering a disclaimer couched in false modesty. In the twenty
years during which he served on the Supreme Judicial Court, he wrote a total of twelve dissenting
opinions and voted in dissent eleven other times. He wrote a total of 1,291 opinions in that period.
H. SHRIVER, supra note 51 at 324-26.
71. 167 Mass. at 104,44 N.E. at 1080.
72. Id.
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ated that the assumption was unwarranted, 73 there being adequate safeguards in the Final Decree against the use of unlawful means by the two
pickets. Holmes rejected the notion that a threat of force was to be implied
from picketing by two men, but he suggested that if he was wrong, the
Final Decree would have served as it had prohibited all threats of force.
Even if the difference between the scope of the two injunctions had
been resolved or had been less controverted, Holmes noted, he would
have taken issue with the majority position over what he termed "the real
difference" 74 between the two decrees. Justification for the conduct of the
defendants, or the lack of it, was the principal point of disagreement
between Holmes and the court. Holmes returned to the arguments
advanced in his earlier opinion, and stated that there was no legal liability
for the intentional infliction of injury to another where the law regarded
the actor as being justified. It was with respect to the issue of what
constituted justification that he remarked,
and more especially on the nature of the considerations which really
determine or ought to determine the answer to that question, that
judicial reasoning seems to me often to be inadequate. The true
grounds of decision are consideration of policy and of social
advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained
merely by logic and the general propositions of law which nobody
75
disputes.
He argued that public policy is always open to contention, and matters of
economics and competition were subjects of considerable dispute. It is
generally accepted, however, "that free competition is worth more to
society than it costs .... ,,76 An element of competition may be "the
intentional inflicting of temporal damage" n7 when done to another "as an
8
instrumentality in reaching the end of victory in the battle of trade."7
Holmes believed that in such cases the justification for injury imposed was
clear as a matter of tort law and that "the only debatable ground is the
nature of the means by which such damage may be inflicted."79 The means
certainly could not be force or threats of force, but if one entrepreneur
73. "[l]t cannot be said, I think, that two men walking together up and down a sidewalk and
speaking to those who enter a certain shop do necessarily and always thereby convey a threat of
force... especially when they are, and are known to be, under the injunction of this court not to
do so." Id. at 105, 44 N.E. at 1080.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 105-06,44 N.E. at 1080. Nelles and Mermin referred to this insight in 1936 as a
"paragraph which there may still be some who do not know by heart." Supra note 60, at 528.
76. 167 Mass. at 106, 44 N.E. at 1080.
77. Id.,44N.E.at 1081.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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competed with another, injury "may be done by persuasion to leave a
rival's shop and come to the defendant's." 80 Holmes noted that according
to settled law injury may also be imposed by a competitor withdrawing benefits "from third persons who have a right to deal or not to
deal with the plaintiff, as a means of inducing them not to deal with him
either as customers or servants."8' He declared that threats, compulsion,
annoyance, or intimidation directed against another were not unlawful
without regard to the end sought and means used. One is free under the
law to threaten another with action which is permissible under the circumstances, such as trade competition, thus allowing the other a chance to
avoid that action.
Holmes perceptively characterized the enduring conflict between
employers and employees as competition:
If the policy on which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in
the term free competition, we may substitute free struggle for life.
Certainly the policy is not limited to struggles between persons of the
same class competing for the same end. It applies to all conflicts of
temporal interests. 82
This often quoted passage enabled Holmes to contrast rules regulating the
conduct of businessmen in dealings with each other to the law governing
the relationship between capital and labor. He believed that there was a
double standard in the law which left businessmen free to engage in
unregulated competition with one another but which tied workers to strict
standards of accountability in tort in their struggles with employers.
Rejecting a theory "which latterly has been insisted on a good deal"8 3
Holmes dismissed the suggestion that a combination by a group to do
what an individual was free to do, could somehow transform that conduct
into unlawful behavior. He argued
that free competition means combination, and that the organization
of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might and
scope of combination. It seems to me futile to set our faces against this
tendency. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even
the fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed. 84
80.

Id. at 106-07, 44 N.E. at1081.
81. Id.at 107,44 N.E. at 1081.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 108, 44 N.E. at 1081. Holmes' future colleague on the United States Supreme
Court, John Marshall Harlan, had stoutly maintained that combination could convert lawful
behavior into unlawful conspiracy in Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F.310 (7th Cir. 1894). In Massachusetts, the law was as Holmes stated. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111 (1842). Another
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Holmes explained that if it was as inevitable that labor would combine to
reach its ends as it was obvious that capital had already been permitted tq
combine to further its interests, the law must change to meet that fact. The
most famous segment of his opinion followed:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between
the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that
of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for
the least possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and
powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and ddsirable
85
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.
Holmes argued that the law was required to grant to working people the
same liberty to support their interests "by argument, persuasion, and the
bestowal or refusal of those advantages which they otherwise lawfully
control" 86 as had been granted to capital. He noted that strikes which were
devoid of violence or broken contracts had become acceptable to society
and the law,8 7 so that the only rdmaining legal standard to be evolved wag
for judging the methods of working people.88 Indeed, the analysis which
Holmes applied to the dispute was so compelling that his confidence was
justified. The next time the issue was presented to his court, the majority
adopted the approach which he had expounded.
THE IMPACT OF VEGELAHN

The court had decided, in Vegelahn, that whether or noi wage strikes
were unlawful,8 9 picketing to bring pressure on employers was not permissible in Massachusetts. The intimidation of the public, either as potenanalyst, discussing the legality of unionism as a practical matter, referred to this section of
Holmes' opinion as "the clearest instance of this view." G. GROAT, A-riTUDE OF AMERICAN
COURTS IN LABOR CASES 140 (1911).
85. 167 Mass. at 108,44 N.E. at 1081.
86. Id.
87. "I can remember when many people thought that, apart from violence or breach o'f
contract, strikes were wicked, as organized refusals to work. I suppose that intelligent economists
and legislators have given up that notion to-day." Id. at 108-109, 44 N.E. at 1081.
88. I feel pretty confident that [the community] will abandon ihe idea that an organized
refusal by workmen of social intercourse with a man who shall enter their antagonist's,
employ is wrong, if it is dissociated from any threat of violence, and is made for the sole
object of prevailing if possible in a contest with their employer about the rate of wages.
Id. at 109,44 N.E. at 1081-82.
89. The Supreme Judicial Court, avoiding Holmes' supposition, (see supra note 87) had
never squarely decided the question. In Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111 (1842), the court
was faced with a strike by unionized workers who refused to work with those Were not
members of their union. The court held that legal means had been used by the workers to attain a
legal end and, therefore, the strike broke no law. The legality of wage strikes, in the absence of
conflicting contracts, was not seriously in doubt thereafter in Massachusetts. "A combination
among persons merely to regulate their own conduct is within allowable competition, and is
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tial employees or as potential customers of Vegelahn, was behavior that
was too anti-social to be condoned. Holmes' argument was that the
picketing, even if threatening or intimidating, contrary to his perception
of it, should be justified as simple and fair trade competition. In the
absence of violent conduct, he could attribute no illegality to the behavior
of the pickets.
Four years later, in its decision in Plant v. Woods,90 the Supreme
Judicial Court revealed a change in its interpretation of the economic

pressure brought against employers by trade unions. A schism in a union
of painters had produced a bitter contest for economic supremacy
between two groups seeking the same jobs. One group threatened
employers with a refusal to work wherever its rivals were also employed,
unless the latter group agreed to join their association. The employers who
were intimidated or coerced by these threats sought judicial assistance

through restraining orders and injunctions against continued threats or

refusals to work. In what one authority has described as "a serious abuse
of judicial authority, 1' the Supreme Judicial Court ascribed to the
defendants' mere threat to strike, the most serious consequences possible 92
and refused "to bring the acts of the defendants under the shelter of the
principles of trade competition."9 3
Significantly, in Plant v Woods, the court held that "in many cases

the lawfulness of an act which causes damage to another may depend

upon whether the act is for justifiable cause; 9 4 thereby conceding to

workers acting in concert a standard for the judging of their tactics in

economic warfare which it had previously been unwilling to extend to any

group other than entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, it must be added that the
court, upon reviewing the behavior in question with this standard, found
lawful, although others may be indirectly affected thereby." Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. at
98, 44 N.E. at 1077. Furthermore, the leading federal case on the subject, Arthur v. Oakes, 63
F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894), declared that the federal constitution, prohibiting involuntary servitude,
would bar a prohibition of strikes. For a more elaborate review of Commonwealth v. Hunt, see
Nqelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1128 (1932) and Witte, Early American
Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825 (1926).
90. 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
91. C. GREGORY, supra note 52, at 64.
92. These included "unlawful physical injury" to property, injury to the employer's
business and "his ruin, if possible," and "actual and threatened personal violence" to employees
who do not strike or those who apply for employment. 176 Mass. at 496-97, 57 N.E. at 1013.
93. "The necessity that the plaintiffs should join this association is not so great, nor is its
relation to the rights of the defendants, as compared with the right of the plaintiffs to be free from
molestation, such as to bring the acts of the defendants under the shelter of the principles of trade
competition. Such acts are without justification, and therefore are malicious and unlawful, and
the conspiracy thus to force the plaintiffs was unlawful. Such conduct is intolerable, and
inconsistent with the spirit of our laws." Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015.
94. Id. at 499, 57 N.E. at 1014.
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that "such acts are without justification, and therefore are malicious and
unlawful ....,95
Holmes, who had become Chief Judge of the court, filed another
separate opinion in which, while dissenting, he understood the change of
his colleagues' interpretation of the law since their confrontation in Vegelahn v Guntner:"[M]uch to my satisfaction, if I may say so, the court has
seen fit to adopt the mode of approaching the question which I believe to
be the correct one . ..."96 He elaborated, with what must ha- e been
considerable satisfaction:
I agree that the conduct of the defendants is actionable unlessjustified.
May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11, 14, and cases cited. I agree that the
presence or absence of justification may depend upon the object of
their conduct, that is, upon the motive with which they acted. Vegelahn
v. Guntner,167 Mass. 92, 105, 106 ....I infer that a majority of my
brethren would admit that a boycott or strike intended to raise wages
directly might be lawful, if it did not embrace in its scheme or intent
violence, breach of contract, or other conduct unlawful on grounds
independent of the mere fact that the action of the defendants was
combined ....To come directly to the point, the issue is narrowed to
the question whether, assuming that some purposes would be ajustification, the purpose in this case of the threatened boycotts and strikes
97
was such as to justify the threats.
Holmes was attempting to nudge the court into a further acceptance of his
analysis of picketing, this time to approve peaceful picketing to bring
about a closed shop. He argued that if it was lawful to strike and to picket
to obtain higher wages, then what might be considered a preliminary
objective, the strengthening of the union through increased membership
by the establishment of a closed shop, should also be the lawful end of a
strike and peaceful picketing. He emphasized his point with language
similar to his dissent in Vegelahn: "I think that unity of organization is
necessary to make the contest of labor effectual, and that societies of
laborers lawfully may employ in their preparation the means which they
might use in the final contest. 9 8 In 1906 when the court again was
presented with the question, it changed its position into substantial
agreement with Holmes' analysis.9
95. Id. at 502, 57 N.E. at 1015.
96. Id. at 504,57 N.E. at 1016. He had also noted that in its decision in Allen v. Flood, 1898
A.C. 1, the English House of Lords had substantially agreed with the mode of analysis he had
urged in Vegelahn. See also 14 L.Q. Rev. 129, 132 (1898).
97. 176 Mass. at 504-05, 57 N.E. at 1016.
98. Id. at 505, 57 N.E. at 1016.
99. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906), held that despite the resulting
financial loss to the rivals, union craftsmen were within their rights in refusing to work for an
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The theories which Holmes published in the Massachusetts Reports,
and which became so influential in the development of the law, were the
result of long deliberation. His habit of thinking analytically about the law
was due, in part, to his authorship of a number of published works. 00
Some of these pieces show the growth of his theories about the law
regulating the activities of combinations of laborers. In a brief note
published in 1873, which discussed the outcome of a discomforting strike

in England, Holmes considered the effect of legislation which was applied
against the strikers. 10 1 He commented that the workers might be seen as
involved in a struggle which required them to put their interests at
variance with those of others. It was natural and right that they should do
so. It was also natural, however, that their stronger opponents would use
whatever means they had available to destroy the strike and the alliance of
workers. Fresh from his brutalizing experience in the Civil War, Holmes

was showing a streak of determinism which spiced his work throughout

his long career, 102 but he understood early that labor and capital were

involved in direct competition for economic power.
An article published in 1894103 is also important to an understanding
of Holmes' theory. Cited authoritatively by the majority in Plant v.
Woods, although curiously without attribution to their colleague, this
work became "the fountain-head of analysis" 104 for judicial review of

picketing activities. In the law of torts, Holmes began, familiar justifications for action permitting defendants to escape liability have usually
included the defense of privilege. The degree to which privilege might be a
defense for injurious behavior is a question of policy which should depend
upon the reasoning of the legislature and not properly upon that ofjudges.
employer at certain tasks unless the employer took other tasks away from rival craftsmen and
assigned the work to them. The practical result of this holding was to permit the union craftsmen
to obtain a closed shop. For an analysis of this case, see C. GREGORY, supra note 52 at 69-75. The
Massachusetts legislature accepted Holmes' conclusion in 1913, enacting St. 1913, c. 690,
amended by St. 1933, c.272 (Gen. Laws c.149 sec.24) permitting peaceable solicitation to
persuade another to one's cause. Finally, in 1938, the Supreme Judicial Court conceded that
Vegelahn v. Gunner had ceased to be a Statement of current valid law. Simon v. Schwachman,
301 Mass, 573, 576-77, 18 N.E. 2d 1, 4 (1938).
100. "As teacher of constitutional law to Harvard undergraduates, as editor of [the twelfth
edition of Kent's Commentaries], and as contribution to the American Law Review he was led, at
the very beginning of his professional career, to examine a number of the most important public
issues of the day." HOWE, THE PROVING YEARS, supra note 24, at 32.
101. The Gas Stokers'Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582 (1873). Holmes served as editor of The
American Law Review from 1870 to 1873. See HOWE, THE PROVING YEARS, supra note 24, at 10.
102. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See also E. Wilson, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in Patriotic Gore-Studies in the Literature of the American Civil War 743 (1962), Rogat,
Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1962), and HOWE, THE PROVING
YEARS, supra note 24, at 42-50.
103. Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
104. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNcTION 24 (1930).
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He maintained policies must be set up in generalities, "but plainly the
worth or the result, or the gain from allowing the act to be done, has to be
compared with the loss which it inflicts." 10 5 These evaluations may include
the belief "that free competition is worth more to society than it costs,
...that a line must be drawn between the conflicting interests of adjoining owners which necessarily will restrict the freedom of each.. .and...
that the benefit of free access to information, in some cases and0 6within
some limits, outweighs the harm to an occasional unfortunate."
Holmes noted that the defense of privilege was not general, but
limited, since it often depended upon the motives of the actor. For
example, in the case of interference with another's business, it is desirable
that people should be free to advise others, but it is not desirable that one
should wrongly lose his business. Therefore, if advice was believed to be
good and if it was given to benefit the hearers, the defendant would not be
liable. If the defendant's motive had been only to harm the business,
liability would result.
"If the privilege is qualified," Holmes wrote, "the policy in favor of
the defendant's freedom generally will be found to be qualified only to the
extent of forbidding him to use for the sake of doing harm, what is allowed
him for the sake of good." 0 7 These are hard distinctions to make,
certainly, "and the distinctions on which they go will be distinctions of
degree,"'0 8 but the legislature is still capable of making them. "Views of
policy are taught by experience of the interests of life. Those interests are
fields of battle."' 1 9 Holmes illustrated his point with a review of cases
which showed that combinations of merchants were lawful while
combinations of laborers in a trade union were not.
Holmes believed that these cases established that "the ground of
decision really comes down to a proposition of policy of rather a delicate
nature concerning the merit of the particular benefit to themselves
intended by the defendants, and suggests a doubt whether judges with
different economic sympathies might not decide such a case differently
when brought face to face with the issue.""10 For Holmes, there seemed to
be no doubt. "Behind all is the question whether the courts are not flying
in the face of the organization or the world which is taking place so fast,
and of its inevitable consequences."' These choices of policy ought to be
105.
106.
cannot be
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

Supra note 103, at 3.
Supra note 103, at 3-4. The similarity to Holmes phrases in Vegelahn v. Guntner
overlooked.
8 HARV. L. REV. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at8.
Id. at 8-9.
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made knowingly, intelligently, and by people with the appropriate responsibility. In any policy, "the advantages to the community, on one side and
the other, are the only matters really entitled to be weighed." 12 Judges
were not the people to be making those decisions, Holmes concluded.
In another article three years later," 3 Holmes enlarged upon this
theme. These policy matters, he stated, "really are battle grounds where
the means do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time,
and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a
given body in a given time and place."" 4 Commenting about lawyers, but
necessarily about judges too, he noted, "I cannot but believe that if the
training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more definitely and
explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be
justified, they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident,
and see that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often
burning questions."" 5
Holmes' analysis of privilege and its place as ajustification in the law
of tort was the basis for his dissent in Vegelahn. His rhetoric on the
struggle between opposing interests gave to this analysis the substance
which he needed to apply his theory to the controversy between the
employer and the pickets. He found partial success in the grudging
decision of his court in Plant v. Woods. Holmes' urging of judicial
restraint, emphasized by the inequitable power of an employer armed
with an injunction, was less compelling to his court and others, even
though his argument was finally persuasive." 6
The significance of the Holmes' opinions was not long in being
recognized.' 7 Scholars noticed the dissents soon after their publication. 118
Melville M. Bigelow, Dean of the Law School at Boston University and
one of the prominent theoreticians of legal education, used Holmes'
112.

Id. at 9.
113. The Pathof the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). Since the opinion in Vegelahn v.
Guntner was announced on October 26, 1895 and The Path of the Law is an address delivered
January 8, 1897, the two are virtually contemporaneous.
114. Id. at466.
115. Id. at468. See Scrutton, The Work of the CommercialCourts, I CAMB. L.J. 6,8 (1921).
For a discussion of the theory that Holmes considered law to be a social tool, see D. RICHARDSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 43 (1924).

116. See infra notes 160-84 and accompanying text.
117. The most important significance, as far as Holmes was concerned, was the weight
given the opinions by President Theodore Roosevelt in his decision to appoint Holmes to the
U.S. Supreme Court in 1902. Supra note 69.
118. After only seventeen months, Professor Charles Noble Gregory had published an
article calling the Vegelahn opinion "a powerful dissent." Gregory, Government by Injunction,
II HARV. L. REV. 487, 500 (1898). In December, 1896 a student note on the decision had
appeared, commenting that ".. . Mr. Justice Holmes seems to have the advantage over the
majority of the court in the discussion." 10 HARV. L. REV. 301, 302 (1896).
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dissents in Vegelahn and Plantv. Woods as the centerpieces in an analysis
of contemporary law. Dean Bigelow called for realism and scientific
methods in the law to enable its students and practitioners to cope with the
great changes of the day. Using labor relations decisions of the courts to
review the inability of judges to evolve law which would effectuate desirable public policy, Bigelow discussed the decisions of the Massachusetts
court and lamented the outcome. He found consolation and optimism in
the opinions of Holmes.119
Professor John H. Wigmore evaluated the dissent in Vegelahn with
great praise. Wigmore stated that the Holmes opinions on labor relations

are some of his most distinctive and continued that, "no man can consider
himself to have a respectable conviction on this subject unless he has faced
120
and settled with the dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Guntner." The
121

tone of evaluations of this work has not changed in the ensuing years.
Within the judicial profession, Holmes' analysis was reviewed,

whether or not specifically cited and followed, by state and federal courts
alike. In Massachusetts the work of its former Chief Judge, after his

promotion to the national Supreme Court bench,122 had been incorpo-

rated into the opinions of the court in Plant v. Woods 2 3 and Pickett v.
Walsh. 124 Relatively few labor relations cases made specific note of Vegelahn in succeeding years,12 5 but those which contemplated the problem of
119. "In any view of the subject one cannot too much admire the strength and the
consistency of the argument throughout of the distinguished judge (Holmes) who upheld the
losing side. The reason why that was the losing side was because the tendency of the social
equilibrium was steadily the other way. That tendency may not be permanent; it may be turned
back-no one can tell-and the argument which failed may be set up again and prevail." M.
BIGELOW, The Extension of Legal Education in CENTRALIZATION AND THE LAW, 1, 11-12 n.2
(1906). M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 109 n.3 (1943).
120. J. Wigmore, Justice Holmes andthe Law of Torts, 29 HARV. L. REV. 601,614 (1916).
See I L. TELLER, THE LAW GOVERNING LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING §74

(1940). Treatise authors agreed; see W. MARTIN, LAW OF LABOR UNIONS 12 (1910); G. GROAT
supra, note 85.
121. C. Gregory, supra note 52 at 62 terms it the work of "a true legal prophet." "[T]he
classic dissent," say F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREEN supra note 104 at 27. A thoughtful review
may be found in S. KONEFSKY THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 20 (1956). For an
English comment on the Vegelahn dissent, see infra note 157 and accompanying text. In
addition to contributing to the development of labor relations law, Holmes has been credited
with the invention of the doctrine of the primafacietort in his Vegelahn dissent. Alberto Diaz v.
Kay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 582, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445 (1970); State ex rel. Taylor v.
Circuit court of Marion County, 240 Ind. 94, 98, 162 N.E.2nd 90, 92 (1959); Annot. 16 A.L:R.
3d 1191 (1967).
122. Holmes left the Massachusetts bench in 1902. See supra note 69.
123. 176 Mass. 492,57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
124. 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906). See supra note 99.
125. Disputes involving commercial torts cited Vegelahn authoritatively. E.g. Silsbee v.
Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 50 N.E. 555 (1898) (conveyance of property after a threat); Moran v.
Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 1125 (1901) (slander inducing discharge from employment);
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the legality of workers' concerted action used a Holmesian mode of
analysis. 126

As Holmes well knew, the use of his theory of competition as
justification did not insure that labor would obtain a favorable result.127 In
L D. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Driscoll,t28 the Massachusetts court was

presented with another strike for a closed shop. Although the majority
opinion based its decision on the presence or absence of competitive

justification for the action of the workers, it followed its conclusion in
Plant v. Woods and held both that the closed shop was an unlawful
objective in Massachusetts and that the union's activity was properly
enjoined. A dissent by two judges unsuccessfully argued the same points
raised by Holmes in Plant v. Woods, that both the means and the end of
the union were justified.
The division in Willcutt illustrated a problem frequently encountered
by judges when reviewing the competitive action taken by unions. Noting
that strikes were generally legal, or that a specific strike was legal, a court
often would hold that the means used by the union amounted to intimidation, coercion, or violence and were unlawful and to be enjoined.
Holmes had dealt with this problem in Vegelahn when he considered
whether the behavior of the pickets would present "threats of personal
injury,' 1 29 or "stop the plaintiffs door," or "break existing contracts,"130
and had decided that the possibility of such activity should be enjoined.

Differentjudges naturally would react to given circumstances in different
ways and reach inconsistent conclusions.131 Decisions of the Supreme
Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144, 72 N.E. 839 (1905) (conspiracy to interefere with a contract);
Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N.E. 817 (1907) (injunction to restrain interference
with a contract); Davis v. New England Ry. Publishing Co., 203 Mass. 470, 89 N.E. 565 (1909)
(injunction to restrain interference with business).
126. E.g., Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947).
127. Holmes was personally indifferent to the outcome of the litigation, as befitted his
judicial impartiality, and expressed some annoyance at the importance attached to it. I
HOLMES-POLLOCK LErrERS 106 (Howe ed. 1941). Holmes had merely placed the Vegelahn
controversy into his comprehensive scheme of tort law; the affect of his judicial analysis was
immaterial to him. See M. Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the
Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REv. 975, 1040 (1977). This is not to say that Holmes was
disinterested in the problems of organized labor. In a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock, he related
with some relish his visit to a prominent labor leader and the instructive conversation which
ensued. I HOLMES-LEMI-ERS 44 (Howe ed. 1941). (I am indebted to Judge Hiller Zobel for the
final reference.)
128. 200 Mass. 110, 85 N.E. 897 (1908).
129. 167 Mass. at 95,44 N.E. at 1077.
130. Id. at 96, 44 N.E. at 1077.
131. See Rogers v. Evarts, 17 N.Y.S. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1891), ("It may be impossible to lay
down a general rule as to what surrounding circumstances will characterize persuasion and
entreaty as intimidation. Each case must probably depend upon its own surroundings.') Id. at
269, and Stephens v. Ohio State Tel. Co., 240 F. 759, 771 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
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despite the application of
Judicial Court reflect this variance in judgment,
132
the same theory of problem analysis.

Courts outside of Massachusetts followed the same analytical procedure, often citing Vegelahn, or setting out quite similar theories. Holme33
sian language was used by the Supreme Court of Indiana in a controversy similar to that in Vegelahn:
So, in a contest between employees and employers on the one hand to
secure higher wages, and on the other to resist it, arguments and
persuasion to win support and cooperation from others are proper to
either side, provided they are of a character to leave the persons
34
solicited feeling at liberty to comply or not, as they please.
135
Although many states followed this analysis, it was not to be expected
136
that all would do so.
The federal courts also had many opportunities to pass judgment on
37
strikes and picketing. ConsolidatedSteel & Wire Co. v. Murray, is the
first post-Vegelahn decision to cite it. Confronted with picketing by
striking workers and others the court issued an injunction against concerted action by the workers, and granted some minimum legal concessions to the union. The court found judicial decisions to be in harmony on
the issues and the law and noted that,

while they recognize the right of employees of whatever rank or degree
132. Labor relations decisions in which the Supreme Judicial Court used the mode of
analysis called for by Holmes include M. Steinert and Sons. Co. v. Tagen, 207 Mass. 394,93 N.E.
584 (1911); Minasian v. Osborne, 210 Mass. 250, 96 N.E. 1036 (1911); Mechanics' Fdy. &
Machine Co. v. Lynch, 236 Mass. 504,128 N.E. 877 (1920); Rice, Barton & Fales Machine & Iron
Co. v. Willard, 242 Mass. 566, 136 N.E. 629 (1922); and Goyette v. Watson Co., 245 Mass. 577,
140 N.E. 285 (1923). Massachusetts ultimately codified the Holmesian analysis, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 149, §24 (1971) and inferentially overruled Vegelahn v. Guntnerin 1938. See supra note
100. Holmes, from his prestigious vantage point in Washington, D.C., had reminded successor
Massachusetts lawmakers that his ideas had not changed. In a dissent filed in Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1,27 (1914), he cited his opinions in Vegelahn and Plant v. Woods and remarked "I still
entertain the opinions expressed by me in Massachusetts."
133. Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union No. 1131, 165
Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905).
134. Id. at 431,75 N.E. at 881.
135. Everett Waddey Co. v Richmond Typographical Union No. 90, 105 Va. 188,53 S.E.
In re Heffron, 179 Mo. App. 639, 162 S.W. 652 (1913); Parkinson Co. v. Building
(1906);
273
Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P.1027 (1908); Kemp v. Divison No. 241,255 111.213,99 N.E.
289 (1912); State v. Stockford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 A. 769 (1904); Gray v. Building Trades Council,
91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663 (1903); National Protective Ass'n. of Steam Fitters and Helpers v.
Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902); The Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J.
Eq. 759,53 A. 230 (1902); Jones v. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, 131 Ga. 336,62 S.E. 236
(1908).
136. E.g., Purvis v. Local No. 500, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 214 Pa. 348,63
(1906), where the court held that the mere demand for recognition of the union by an
585
A.
employer was itself threatening and coercive, and therefore, unlawful and to be enjoined.
137. 80 F 811 (N.D. Ohio 1897). The decision was announed on May 8, 1897.
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to combine for the purpose of resisting any measures of oppression or
coercion by their employers, and even for the purpose of instituting
strikes and adopting other measures for their own protection or for the
bettering of their condition, they are agreed that they must not interfere with the rights of employers to manage their own business in their
own way, so long as they do not trespass upon the rights of others.138
In short, interference with the employer's business, in any manner, beyond
the mere withholding of one's own labor, was considered to be an unlawful act. The court correctly described this conclusion as being in harmony
with that of other courts which had considered similar questions, including the opinion of the court in Vegelahn, which it quoted and discussed at
length. It did not mention, however, the separate opinion of Holmes nor
did the court consider the alternative analysis which he had offered. The
court, instead, aggressively and belligerently asserted that it would be
ready to enjoin, as necessary, any attempt by labor organizations to
exceed the limits of the law. 139

Six months later, in Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 140 the Court of
Appeals for the eighth federal circuit was presented with a dispute over the
availability of an injunction against an agreement between labor unions to
conduct an organized boycott against machine-made barrels for the
purpose of preserving work for coopers. Conceding the right of workers
to organize in furtherance of their own interests, the court stated that there
is a general prohibition in the law against interfering with "the right of an
individual to carry on his business as he sees fit..
,,141 But concluding on
a slightly different analytical basis, it held:
We think it is entirely clear, upon the authorities, that the conduct of
which the defendants below were accused cannot be justified on the
ground that the acts contemplated were legitimate and lawful means
to prevent a possible future decline in wages, and to secure employment for a greater number of coopers. 42
The possible defense ofjustification conceded in this legal analysis, due to
the need to protect the legitimate ends of the unions, introduced a significant new consideration for the federal courts.
One judge dissented from the majority opinion in Hopkins, and his
argument may have been responsible for pushing the majority into this
138. Id. at 828.
139. ". . . the courts will be ready for the emergency whenever and wherever
the spirit of
anarchy may manifest itself, whether within or without the lodges, and the American
people, if
need be, will rise in their majesty and their might, and crush it as a trip-hammer
would crush an
eggshell." 80 F at 829.
140. 83 F 912 (8th Cir. 1897).
141. Id. at 917.
142. Id. at 921.
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new concession. In a long and compelling dissent, Judge Henry C.
Caldwell argued that the combination of laborers in unions to further
their own interests is "a natural and inherent right." 43 He quoted Holmes'
dissent in Vegelahn at length and then urged that "it is a fundamental error
to deny to labor the rights and privileges of competition, upon the ground
44
that labor, is not ... entitled to any of the rights of capital." He
maintained that "t]he right of organization itself may as well be denied to
[laborers], if the right of peaceful and orderly collective action is denied to
them."'1 45 Competition, according to Caldwell, should be defined to
include peaceful behavior in the self-interest of capital or labor, and in
competing with capital, labor should be justified in asserting its combined
economic power in a peaceful manner however troublesome to an
employer that might be.
Subsequent federal judicial decisions dealing with requests46for injunctions in labor disputes often referred to the Vegelahn dissent, if only to
take pains to explain how the injunction being issued fell into Holmes'
exceptions for improper methods such as violent or intimidating behavior
by pickets. In modifying an injunction issued by the trial judge, the court
14 7
in Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis Chalmers Co., used language
strikingly similar to that of Holmes:
A strike is one manifestation of the competition, the struggle for
survival or place, that is inevitable in individualistic society. Dividends
and wages must both come from thejoint product of capital and labor.
And in the struggle wherein each is seeking to hold or enlarge his
ground, we believe it is fundamental that one and the same set of rules
should govern the action of both contestants ....In contests between
143.
144.

Id. at 929.
Id. at 937.

145. Id., at 939. Caldwell's understanding of labor economics did not depend upon
Holmes. Three years before, he had written the following analysis, in an action disputing the
right of railroad management to decrease wages: "A corporation is organized capital; it is
capital consisting of money and property. Organized labor is organized capital; it is capital
consisting of brains and muscle. What it is lawful for one to do it is lawful for the other to do. If
it is lawful for the stockholders and officers of a corporation to associate and confer together for
the purpose of reducing the wages of its employees, or of devising other means of making their
investments profitable, it is equally lawful for organized labor to associate, consult, and confer
with a view to maintain or increase wages. Both act from the prompting of enlightened
selfishness, and the action of both is lawful when no illegal or criminal means are used or
threatened." Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 62 F. 7, 14 (D. Neb. 1894).
146. American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' Unions Nos. I and 3,
90 F. 608 (N.D. Ohio 1898) (injunction granted); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 F 102 (D. Neb.
1902) (injunction granted); Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 F 563 (E.D. Mo. 1903) (injunction
denied); Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union No. 125, 150 R 155 (E.D. Wis. 1906)
(injunction granted), modified 166 F 45 (7th Cir. 1908); Alaska S.S. Co. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n., 236 F 964 (W.D. Wash. 1916) (injunction granted).
147. 166 F. 45 (7th Cir. 1908), modifying 150 F. 155 (E.D. Wis. 1906).
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capital and labor the only means of injuring each other that are lawful
are those that operate directly and immediately upon the control and
supply of work to be done and of labor to do it, and thus directly affect

the apportionment of the common fund, for only at this point exists
the competition, the evils of which organized society will endure rather

than suppress the freedom and initiative of the individual.148

It had become distinctly easier for federal courts to follow Holmes'
theory of analysis in 1904. Writing for a majority of the United States
Supreme Court in a decision 149 affirming a conviction under a Wisconsin
statute for the unlawful combination of three businesses for the direct
purpose of competitively injuring a fourth company, Holmes elaborated
and incorporated his theory ofjustification into the federal law of torts. 50
Federal trial and appeals courts worked Holmes' standard further
into the common law of labor relations during the next decade.' 5' That
period culminated with Congress' passage of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act
of 1914,152 which codified much of the federal case law developed since the
Vegelahn decision in 1896. Section 20 of the Act 5 3 protected both strikes
conducted in furtherance of the lawful objects of labor and the peaceful
persuasion of others to join in its cause. After 1914, in suits of this type, the
federal courts, based upon their interpretation of the statute, usually
permitted the union activity to continue. 154 In 1921, the decision of the
148. 166 F at 50-51. See also Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 F.148 (N.D. Ohio 1906)
and Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 F. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
149. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
150. It has been considered that, primafacie,the intentional infliction of temporal
damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law ...
requires a
justification if the defendant is to escape. If this is the correct mode of approach it is
obvious that justifications may vary in extent according to the principle of policy upon
which they are founded, and that while some, for instance, at common law, those
affecting the use of land are absolute, others may depend upon the end for which the act
is done.
Id. at 204. Some authorities cite this paragraph as significant in developing the primafacie tort
doctrine. Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3d 1191, 1197 (1967). See supra,note 122.
151. E.g., Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, 150 F.148 (N.D. Ohio 1906); Gill Engraving Co.
v. Doer, 214 F. I I1 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 247 F. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
affd, 252 F 722 (2d Cir. 1918), rev'd, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason
Builders' Ass'n., 169 F.259 (2d Cir. 1909); Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis Chalmers Co.,
166 F. 45 (7th Cir. 1908); Lowev. California State Fed'n of Labor, 139 F. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1905). Of
course, there were contrary ideas expressed as to the ends or means of labor. Kolley v. Robinson,
187 F. 415(8th Cir. 1911); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Gee 139 F. 582 (S.D. Iowa 1905).
152. Ch. 323,38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§12-27, 29 U.S.C. §152, 53)
(1976).
153. Ch. 323 §20, 38 Stat. 730, 738; 39 U.S.C. §52.
154. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 252 F. 722 (2d Cir. 1918), rev'd, 254 U.S. 443
(1921); Tri-City Central Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, 238 F. 728 (7th Cir. 1916)
modified, 257 U.S. 184 (1921). But see Stephens v. Ohio State Tel. Co., 240 F 759 (N.D. Ohio
1917).
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55 however,
U.S. Supreme Court in Duplex PrintingPressCo. v. Deering,1
construed Section 20 narrowly enough to eliminate the statute as a bar to
injunctions against peaceful picketing or solicitation. The court held that
Section 20 added nothing to existing rules, and it specifically prohibited
the union's use of persons, as either pickets or aides in the carrying out of a
boycott against the offending employer, who were not workers at the shop
where the dispute was located.
At about the same time, in late 1920, the opinion in an English case
brought great personal and professional satisfaction to Holmes. A
respected British judge paid him the extraordinary compliment of authoritatively citing the dissenting opinion from an American state court. Lord
Justice Scrutton wrote as a member of the English Court of Appeal,
156
reviewing Ware and De Freville, Ltd. v. Motor Trade Ass'n., which
involved an action for damages against an organization urging a boycott
against the plaintiff for having broken its policy as to pricing merchandise.
While examining the concept ofjustification for the acts of the defendant,
Justice Scrutton remarked that he did "respectfully concur on this point
158
with the admirable judgment of Holmes J. in Vegelahn v. Guntner" and
then, after quoting Holmes, went on to repeat his complimentary
adjective. 158 The court unanimously agreed with Scrutton's conclusion
and exonerated the association. 59 Nevertheless, if ever the Anglophile,
Holmes understood where his work remained.
One year later, in a decision which modified some of the apparent
strictures of Duplex, the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated Holmes'
theory of analysis into its labor relations case law. The dispute in
6°
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades & Labor Council'
concerned the propriety of a broad injunction against union activities

155. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
156. [1921] 3 K.B. 40, 69-70.
157. Id. at 69.
158. Id. at 70. Scrutton found himself in agreement with Holmes on at least one other
occasion. See supra note 115.
159. Following the English practice, each judge felt free to prepare a separate opinion,
and there was no opinion of the court, per se. In an untitled note upon the case, Holmes' old
friend and correspondent, Sir Frederick Pollock wrote of the Vegelahn dissent that "this is one
of the judgments which.., appear, if we may be allowed so familiar an expression, to improve
in the bottle." 37 L.Q. REv. 395, 398 (1921). Pollock had previously complimented Holmes'
opinion in the same journal, and had recommended it as reading for English lawyers as early as
1898. F. Pollock, Allen v. Flood, 14 L.Q. REV. 129, 132. Pollock's admiration of Holmes' work
was also reflected in the many editions of his LAW OF TORTS, all dedicated to Holmes,
beginning in 1886, and in their fifty-eight year private correspondence. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LET-rERS 224 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
160. 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
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during the occurrence of a violent strike over lowered wages. For the
Court,' 6' Chief Justice Taft wrote:
We are a social people and the accosting by one of another in an
inoffensive way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss
information with a view to influencing the other's action are not
regarded as aggression or a violation of the other's rights. If, however,
the offer is declined, as it may rightfully be, then persistence, importunity, following and dogging become unjustifiable annoyance and
obstruction which is likely soon to savor of intimidation.162
Once violence began, Taft declared, all information, arguments, and
persuasion became intimidation because of the circumstances. Conceding
that strikers do have a right to communicate with and attempt to convert
those still working, as well as the right of those others to be free from
intimidation, it became clear that "each case must turn on its own circumstances." 63 An equitable result permits limited representatives of the
strikers to be present for solicitation. "The purpose should be to prevent
the inevitable intimidation of the presence of groups, but to allow
missionaries." 64 Despite the prohibitions of the Clayton Act, as construed
by Duplex, against the involvement of those who were neither present nor
former employees of the struck employer, the court held that interference
in such a dispute by a labor organization was neither malicious nor
without lawful excuse. Such organizations existed, Taft said, because
workers knew that the
[u]nion was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality
with their employer .... To render this combination at all effective,
employees must make their combination extend beyond one shop
.... Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their
membership and especially among those whose labor at lower wages
will injure their whole guild. 65
Having thus modified the holding in Duplex, Taft turned to the legal
theory for justification of the union's attack on the employer. "The
elements essential to sustain actions for persuading employees to leave an
employer are first, the malice or absence of lawful excuse, and, second, the
actual injury."166 We find nothing in the reported decisions, the Court
concluded,
161. Brandeis, J., concurred in the opinion of the Court and Clarke, J., dissented, each
without preparing a separate opinion. 257 U.S. at 213.
162. 257 U.S. at 204.
163. Id. at 206.
164. Id. at 207.
165. Id. at 209.
166. Id. at 210.
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which limits our conclusion here or which requires us to hold that the
members of a local labor union and the union itself do not have
sufficient interest in the wages paid to the employees of any employer
in the community to justify their use of lawful and peaceable
persuasion to induce those employees to refuse to accept such reduced
wages and to quit their employment. 67
The injunction was ordered in accordance with the opinion.
With the decision in American Steel Foundries, the Holmesian
analysis, extending equality of rights of concerted action to labor, as well
as to capital, was raised to the law of the land by the Supreme Court.
Holmes participated in the decision and exerted his influence upon the
other members of the Court, as well as its spokesman, Chief Justice
Taft.168
The embracing of this doctrine by Taft and others of the majority
groups was unsure, however, as two weeks later the Chief Justice released
his opinion for the Court in Truax v. Corrigan,69 a curious, retrogressive
decision condemning boisterous but peaceful picketing of a restaurant by
its striking employees. Their object was to obtain an eight hour day
through the application of economic pressure upon the employer. The
Court held that the object was to injure or destroy the business, and that
the noisy, vigorous picketing used by the union was made illegal by the
Duplex decision. Furthermore, the Court concluded that a state statute,
similar to Section 20 of the Clayton Act, which withheld injunctive powers
from state courts in controversies of this nature, was an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection of the law. Four members of the Court
dissented, with Justice Brandeis delivering an elaborate and historical
analysis, rebutting Taft in detail. Justices Pitney and Clarke disagreed that
peaceful picketing was or could be illegal, and Justice Holmes limited his
opinion to some deprecations over the misuse of the Fourteenth
Amendment.170
167. Id. at 212-13.
168. In a letter to his English friend Harold Laski, two months prior to the decision,
Holmes mentioned having prepared a dissent which had then evolved into a memoranda by Mr.
Justice Pitney and himself. In December, after the decision was announced, Holmes told Laski
of the disappointment which he and Mr. Justice Brandeis felt when after Taft had had "a happy
success in uniting the Court" in American Steel Foundries, 238 F.728 (1916) the Chief Justice
followed it with Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1912), Letter from O.W. Holmes to Harold J.
Laski (Dec. 22, 1921) reprintedin I HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 389 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
169. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
170. Holmes wrote to Laski that Brandeis' dissent, "a very elaborate study," had
conceded that its contents were "not proper for ajudicial opinion, ordinarily, but people are so
ignorant that it was desirable that they should know and I dare say he was right." Of his own
dissent, Holmes remarked, "at B.'s request I wrote a few words before I saw his and as he
wanted me to print I did." Letter from O.W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski, supra note 169.
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ruax was succeeded in due course by Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n. 17 1 Through strikes and boycotts, a
union attempted to strengthen its control of work in the production of
stone for building material. The Supreme Court applied its holding in
Duplex and decided that the union's action was to be construed as an
attack upon interstate commerce. The Court reiterated its previous position that federal anti-trust statutes constituted such a compelling statement of public policy that the right of the workers "to combine for the
purpose of redressing alleged grievances of their fellow craftsmen or of
protecting themselves or their organizations" 172 had to be curtailed. Brandeis and the aging Holmes dissented on the ground that the Court's
application of the anti-trust statutes to this case was unwarranted since the
boycott was not a significant threat to interstate commerce and that even
if the boycott was a restraint on trade, it was an entirely reasonable one. 173
This progression of federal law reached its conclusion with the
passage of the Anti-Injunction (Norris-LaGuardia) Act of 1932,174 which
substantially prohibited the issuance of injunctions by federal courts in
labor cases. The statute effectively accomplished what organized labor
believed that Section 20 of the Clayton Act had been designed to do. The
Norris-LaGuardia Act has continued to serve as a barrier against unwarranted judicial incursion into labor disputes to the present day, although
somewhat modified by judicial construction in 1970.175 One of the authors
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was Felix Frankfurter, then Professor of
Law at Harvard University. In his 1930 gloss on the proposed statute, The
Labor Injunction,176 Frankfurter paid deference to the mode of judicial
analysis which he hoped to see used in the federal courts. "The analysis for
application is the one articulated in the classic dissent by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntner, and adopted by the majority in Plant v.
Woods. Self-interest, in its undefined amplitude, is the end that justifies."1 77 Reviewing the divergent results which various theories had
brought about in the state and federal courts, Frankfurter concluded that

171. 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
172 Id. at 54.
173. Id. at 56-65.
174. 47 Stat. 70 (1931) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§101-115 (1976).
175. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the
Supreme Court held that the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were not so absolute as
they had seemed, and that while entertaining an action brought under §301(a) of the TaftHartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1976), a federal district court may issue an injunction in
circumstances where the grievance of the union was arbitrable and its strike was causing
irreparable injury to an employer.
176. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
177. Id. at 27.
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a comprehensive statute was the best insurance against judicial decisions
based upon analytical error or extra-legal grounds.
CONCLUSION

In modern times, the ideal that peaceful picketing is lawful is a
maxim raised periodically to constitutional status. 78 Today, Vegelahn is
179
rarely cited, and then only for its antiquarian interest, or by those
80
indefatigable Holmesians who find enduring truth in his canons.1 Expe-

rience has proven Holmes correct in his analysis; and in the law, as
Holmes so aptly demonstrated, experience is the most important
ingredient. 18'
Holmes took issue with the conventional logic of the law as he found
it, and argued that the peaceful concerted activity of workers to further
their own interests should not be viewed as interference with the right of
an employer to conduct its business and, therefore, as a tort, subject to
liability and injunction. The force of this re-examination of legal analysis,
by a respected and prominent legal philosopher and historian acting in his
official judicial capacity, was too great to be ignored. The attention it
gained, and the thought it provoked, eased the profound change brought
to the American law of labor relations in the first third of this century.
The purpose of this exposition has been to demonstrate the utility of
the judicial dissenting opinion. It is a thought which ought not to be a
178. Thornill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); but see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976). It is now the rule of the U.S. Supreme Court that peaceful picketing is privileged and to
be protected even at the risk of incidental violence or intimidation, thus marking a complete
reversal of the holding in Vegelahn. See NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665
(1951); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957). I concede, as my colleague Professor Karl
Klare has urged, that Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957), allows states in
formulating local law to revert to an "unlawful objective" test for judging the validity of
picketing.
179. E.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978).
180. Their numbers have inexorably declined with the deaths of those who knew him, but
their commitments were wonderful. Jerome Frank, a true disciple [see J. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930)] while a judge of the federal court of appeals for the second circuit,
produced a chain of nine opinions in four years on subjects as diverse as government contracts,
trademark infringement, and wrongful death actions, each of which managed to include a
reference to the Vegelahn dissent to bolster an obscure point. M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred
Fisher Music Co., Inc. 125 F2d 949, 954 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., dissenting); Perkins v.
Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942); Beidler & Bookmyer, Inc. v. Universal Ins.
Co., 134 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1943); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,320 U.S. 758 (1943); United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1001 (1943)
(Frank, J., dissenting opinion), cert denied, 320 U.S. 733 (1943); Package Closure Corp. v.
Sealright Co., Inc., 141 F2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944); Doehler Metal Furniture Co., Inc. v. United
States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, (2d Cir. 1945)
(Frank, J., concurring); Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,
J., concurring).
181. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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controversial point; but, nonetheless, it is one which should be repeated
from time to time.182 A desire for judicial unanimity is often expressed, but
much less often proved necessary.18 3 That might be because unanimity is

neither as essential nor as worthwhile as some think. Students ofjurisprudence have seen dissents transformed into majority opinions frequently
enough to be able to doubt the general proposition. 84 Judicial inspiration
in any form is a goal to be sought.
182 Holmes did so, himself. Writing of the fallacy that the only force in the development
of law is logic, he criticized
... the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked out like
mathematics from some general axioms of conduct ....So judicial dissent often is
blamed, as if it meantsimply that one side or the other were not doing their sums right,
and, if they would take more trouble, agreement inevitably would come ....We do
not realize how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change
in the habit of the public mind.
Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 456-66 (1897).
183. E.g., E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 2-4,285-86 (1977). C. HUGHES,
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67-70 (1966 ed.); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608 (1895) (White, J., dissenting); Ulmer, Dissent Behavior and the
Social Background of Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. OF POL.580 (1970); HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S
LAWYER 517 (1973).
184. Among the most important of these transmutations was Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting) into Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); among the most speedy was Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601
(1940) (Stone, J. dissenting) into Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); among
the most unpleasant was Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) into Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970),
where Mr. Justice Black (whose opinion for the Court in Sinclair was being discarded) wrote
bitterly, "nothing at all has changed, in fact, except the membership of the Court and the
personal views of one Justice." 398 U.S. at 256 (Black, J. dissenting). Several of the dissents
written by Holmes while a member of the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently became the basis
for reversals of opinion by the Court. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918)
(Holmes, J. dissenting) was succeeded by U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1940); Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923) (Holmes, J. dissenting) was succeeded by West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Tyson and Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927)
(Holmes, J. dissenting) was succeeded by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. U.S. 247 U.S. 402, 422 (1918) (Holmes, J.dissenting) was succeeded by Nye
v. U.S. 313 U.S. 33 (1941); Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142, 148 (1928) (Holmes, J.dissenting)
was succeeded by Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932). Holmes was well aware of the
possibility of subsequent change and may have anticipated the shift which came in Plant v.
Woods: when he opened his dissent in Vegelahn with these words: "In a case like the present, it
seems to me that, whatever the true result may be, it will be of advantage to sound thinking to
have the less popular view of the law stated . . . ." Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. at 104, 44
N.E. at 1079.
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